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WILLS AND ESTATES
REQUISITES AND WITNESSESI N 1947 the Texas Legislature enacted a statutory amendment
regarding the requisites of wills and the attestation thereof.
Article 8283 was amended to read as follows:
"Every last %%ill and testament except %%here otherwise provided by
law, shall be in writing and signed by the testator or by some other
person by his direction and in his presence, and shall, if not wholly in
the handwriting of the testator, be attested by two or more credible
witnesses above the age of fourteen years, subscribing their names
thereto in their own handwriting in the presence of the testator."
Article 8284" was also amended:
"Where the will is wholly written in tie handwriting of the testator
the attestation of the subscribing witnesses may be dispensed with." 4
It will be noted that the words "wholly written by himself" of
Article 8283 were changed to read "wholly in the handwriting
of the testator." The words "wholly written by the testator" of
Article 8284 were changed to read "wholly written in the hand-
writing of the testator." And the words "in their own handwriting"
were added in Article 8283 to the requirement of attesting wit-
nesses' subscriptions-
Before these changes, the courts had generally construed
"wholly written by the testator" to mean "in his handwriting,"
so the changes were not revolutionary." With the statutory amend-
' Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) art. 8283.
2 TEx. Rav. CIV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's Supp., 1947) Art. 8283.
3 Tx. R-v. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's, 1925) Art. 8284.
4 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's Supp., 1947) Art. 8284.
5 44 Tax. Ju. 657, 1 113 (1944): "When written wholly in the handwriting of the
testator, no witness is required to sign the same to give it vitality as a will. In Brackenridge
v. Roberts, 114 Tex. 418,267 S. W. 244 (1924) an important question in deciding whether
a holographic will had been executed with the proper formalities was whether it was writ.
ten wholly in the testator's own handwriting. In Bennett v. Jackson, 172 S. W. (2d) 395
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943) writ of error relused for want of merit, an action was grounded
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ment, it is now certain that a will must be wholly in the testator's
handwriting or it will have to be attested by subscribing witnesses
in their own handwriting.
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS--"PERSONAL PROPERTY":
Gilkey vs. Chambers' is a very interesting case in which the court
construed the term "personal property" to include realty. The will
was written wholly in the handwriting of the testatrix as follows:
"Forney, Texas, Jan. 26-1937
Mrs. A. L. Gilkey's Will T 0 Gilkey owns a half inerst in all of the
live stock, at my death I will him all of my inerst in them, and all of
my persnal property as long as he lives. If his wife Maud Ball Gilkey
out lives him, at her death all of the property must go back to the
Gilkey's heirs. This is my Will T 0 Gilkey executor without Bond.
Mrs A L Gilkey"'
In a five-to-four decision the court construed the will as devis-
ing all of the testratrix's interest in the livestock and a life estate
in all of her other property, real, personal, and mixed. The court
pointed out that the testatrix was uneducated and obviously did
not understand the legal meaning of the term "personal property."
'It was a liberal construction to arrive at the intent of the testatrix.
She evidently employed the term "personal property" to distin-
guish between property which she owned individually and that
which she owned in partnership with her son.8 The court attached
upon allegations that the will was not written wholly in the handwriting of the testator.
In Maul v. Williams, 69 S. W. (2d) 1107 (Tex. Comm. App. 1934) approved, the court
held that an instrument intended by the testatrix as a holographic will should be given
effect as such although it contained words not in the testatrix's handwriting, where such
words were not necessary to complete the instrument in holographic form and did not
affect the meaning; but as the printed matter was not written by the testatrix in any
manner, the question raised by this case would not be affected by the amendment.
It should be noted that TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) art. 23, provides
that the terms "written" or "in writing" include any representation of words, letters or
figures. whether by writing, printing or otherwise unless a different meaning is apparent
from the context.
6 ...... Tex ...... 207 S. W. (2d) 70 (1947).
T Ibid.
8 "Especially where a will bears earmarks of having been drawn by a layman, and
not by a lawyer, the court in the endeavor to arrive at the intent of the testator, will not
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the popular rather than the technical meaning because the testatrix
was obviously uneducated.'
The majority opinion also held that the expression, "all of the
property," was a reference to all of the estate. It was susceptible
of that interpretation and the court felt its duty was so to interpret
it, in order to prevent partial intestacy. As the court pointed out
in a previous case"0, the very purpose of a will is to make such
provisions that the testator will not die intestate.
Chief Justice Alexander was joined by three other justices
in a vigorous dissent, saying that the testatrix used apt words to
limit her bequests to her personal property only, and the Court
should not, under the label of liberalism, place a construction on
the words of her will entirely different from their well-established
meaning, and thereby thwart her purpose as expressed by her.
The dissent contended there was no ambiguity in the terms of the
will as to the character of property bequeathed and a presumption
that the testatrix did not intend to die intestate as to part of her
estate may be invoked only where the will is by its own terms
ambiguous."
The dissent especially protested the allowing of three witnesses
to testify that they had heard the testatrix use the expression "per-
sonal property" to refer to both real and personal property owned
by her individually, as distinguished from that owned jointly by
her with others.1" The majority opinion, however, contended it did
not need to rule on the admissibility of the parol evidence for
such evidence was not essential to support the decision anyway.
view the language technically but liberally and with reference to its popular meaning."
28 R. C. L 224, 1185 (1929).
9 "The court should consider whether the drawer of the will was or was not familiar
with the technical meaning of the words or terms used,. . . not placing too great emphasis
on the precise meaning of the language used where the will is the product of one not
familiar with legal terms, or not trained in their use." 69 C. J. 77, 0 1130 (1934).
20 Heller v. Heller, 114 Tex. 401, 269 S. W. 771 (1925).
21 69 C. J. 132, 31172 (1934).
12 "Extrinsic evidence may not be received for the purpose of increasing, diminishing,
or varying the estate or interest given by an unambiguous will, or to vary the legal effect
of the language used." 4 PACE ON Wu.Ls 642, 01621 (1941).
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CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS-GENERAL LIFE ESTATE
In Medlin v. Medlin, 1 the testator's will was construed to devise
a general rather than a limited life estate. The testator bequeathed
to his wife all his property for her life with the remainder to go
to his children at her death. The controversy centered around the
following provision:
"... in order to keep and preserve the estate in the best manner,
and for my wife to live comfortably, it will be necessary for her in
some instances to lease, sell, transfer, mortgage, and convey part or
all of such properties."''
The court held such words do not indicate an intention to limit
the life estate only to such use as might be necessary for her rea-
sonable and comfortable maintenance and support. The court
reasons thusly because the will then goes on to say,
"I hereby authorize ... my said wife, Minnie Medlin, to so handle
and care for such property as she may see fit an'd proper, including
the mortgaging and sale of any part thereof... ; her judgment in all
of such matters to be controlling and binding.""
In an analogous case, where testator gave his wife the property
"for and during her natural life, to be applied as she may deem
best to the support and maintenance of herself and our children,"
the court was confirmed in the opinion that testator intended to
confer upon his wife, with reference to the property, the absolute
and unrestrained power of disposition."
The court will not impose a burden on the life estate granted
unless there is an express limitation. 7 As no express limitation
can be found in the principal case, Medlin v. Medlin, a general
life estate was held to be granted.
123 203 S. W. (2d) 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ of error refused.
14Id. at 637.
25 Ibid.
16 Orr v. O'Brien, 55 Tex. 149 (1881).
17 In Johnson v. Goldstein, 215 S. W. 840 (Tex. Comm. App. 1919), the will, provid-
ing devisee should have the homestead "to be used and enjoyed by him as a home to live




PRESUMPTION OF DEATH-ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE
OF LIVING PERSON
Christiansen v. Christiansen" is apparently the first case in
which Article 5541 has been brought forward as arresting the run-
ning of statutes of limitation. Article 5541 provides that an estate
recovered on presumption of death shall be restored to the ab-
sentee on proving that he is alive in later suit. 9
In 1934, Chris and Johanna, brother and sister of the deceased
landowner, obtained a partition decree in Texas against Alfred
and other heirs presumed dead because of seven years continuous
absence, unheard of, from their home and residence. Actually
Alfred was alive until 1940. Chris entered into possession of the
lands under the partition decree and claimed adversely against
his co-tenant, Alfred. Margaret, widow anti sole heir of Alfred,
brings this action in Texas in 1945 to recover Alfred's interest in
the land, having just discovered the partition decree.
Chris asserted that he is now protected by the Texas statutes
of limitations, but the court refused to permit the defeat of Mar-
garet's recovery by limitation. The Circuit Court of Appeals held
the partition decree rendered in such circumstances
"... was not a notoriouis art of ouster and was not color of title
upon which to predicate adverse posseqsion, and only by retaking of
possession under adverse claim and in dcnunciation or renunciation
of the decree could Chris's possession become adverse so as to ripen
into a title by limitation. "' -"
It was concluded that Article 3292 and Article 5541, governing
absentees and administration of estates of living persons, under-
took to prevent the taking of a living person's property on pre-
sumption of death, and are on condition that the property be
restored to absentee if he was not dead." The court said:
is 159 F. (2d) 366 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
i9 Tgx. Rzv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5541.
20 159 F. (2d) 366,370 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
2i TEz. R v. Civ. STAT. Atom. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3292, art. 5541.
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"Since the passing of property of a living absentee under the pro-
bate of a will or administration of an estate is void, consistency would
seem also to require that any attempt at passing of title to property of
a living absentee by any other judicial proceeding predicated upon the
presumption of death under Art. 5541, the 'Dead Man's Statute', should
be either proscribed, or else so circumscribed or conditioned as to
afford protection to an absentee later found to be alive."
22
Chris took possession under the partition decree and it was
held he must hold under the statutes under which he took, with
the obligation to return the property on finding the presumption of
death rebutted. So at present in Texas, limitations will not run
against recovery of his estate by an absentee presumed dead,
where the one in possession holds under the presumption of death
statute.3
PROPONENT-"PERSON INTERESTED"
Logan v. Thomason2' gives the best definition so far of "person
interested" under Article 3339, which provides:
"Applications for the probate of a will may be made by the testa-
mentary executor, or by any person interested in the estate of the
testator.":"5
It seems to be the first case in Texas in which a proponent
actually possessed no interest to be affected by the probate of the
will. The proponent was the son of the principal beneficiary, who
predeceased the testator. As the beneficiary was not a lineal
descendant of testator, his gift lapsed. Therefore his son, the pro-
22 159F. (2d) 366, 369 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
28 In Pollock v. Wuntch, 116 S. W. (2d) 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), the absentee
returned and recovered his property two years after a judgment had declared him dead
under the seven years' absence statute. The court there declared that death is a juris-
dictional fact, for Article 3292 reads, "... administration of an estate of a living person
shall be void."
In Beckwith v. Bates, 228 Mich. 400, 200 N. W. 151 (1924), the plaintiff was absent
twenty years. Two years after being judicially presumed dead, she was allowed to recover
her inheritance from the administrator who had already distributed it. Holding such
probate proceedings void ab initio, the court said, "The probate court for want of subject
matter, had no jurisdiction to administer and distribute the property of plaintiff."
2- Tex. ..... 202 S. W. (2d) 212 (1947).
5Tai. Rzv. Crv. STAT. ANr. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3339.
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ponent, would take nothing under the will in the event it was
admitted to probate.
In dismissing the application for probate, the court held that
under the statutes requiring a proponent or contestant of a will
to be a "person interested" in the estate, the interest referred to
must be a pecuniary one held by the party either as an individual
or in a representative capacity, which will be affected by the pro-
bate or defeat of the will. An interest resting on sentiment or
sympathy, or any other basis, other than gain or loss of money or
its equivalent, is insufficient.
Previous Texas cases involved proponents who were "persons
interested" and in holding them competent, certain principles were
established with reference to their qualifications which support the
holding in the principal case.26
The court in the principal case also says that it sees no reason
why the same principle should not apply to the term, "person
interested," as used in Article 3339 with reference to proponents
of a will as it does to the same terms as used in Article 3315"
with reference to contestants.28
REPUBLICATION BY CODICIL
Kotula v. Kotula29 seems to be applying old law to slightly dif-
ferent facts. The testratrix's will of March 21, 1922, gave a son a
share in the residuary etsate; a first codicil reduced the devise;
a second codicil recited settlement agreement and revoked all
20 Ryan v. Texas & Pacific R. R., 64 Tex. 239 (1885): anyone claiming an interest
under a will may present it for probate. lowley v. Sweeney, 288 S. W. 602 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926) : good faith purchasers from devisees and heirs of testator. Hardin v. Ilardin,
66 S. W. (2d) 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933): grantees and mortgagees of property devised
to testatrix's husband.
27 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3315.
2s Cases in regard to contestants being "persons interested": Moore v. Stark, 21 S. W.
(2d) 296 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929) ; Abrams v. Ross' Estate, 250 S. W. 1019 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1923) ; Smith v. Mann, 296 S. W. 613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) writ of error re/used;
Daniels v. Jones, 224 S. W. 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) writ of error refused.
29 198 S. W. (2d) 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) writ of error refused.
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previous testamentary declarations to the son; the third codicil
said,
MY last till and testamntt made by me on March 24, 1922, is
rea /r..:vd and continuied in full I' ure anti effect.'' s0
The son failed in his contention that the third codicil revoked
the antecedent codicils and republished only the original will.
The court held that the third codicil ratified not only the will but
also the first two codicils so the son took nothing because the
second codicil had revoked all devises to him.8"
In a previous decision, it had been held that a second codicil
vestihg property in others on the death of the devisee without
heirs of the body surviving did not revoke the first codicil giving
the devisee the right of disposition during her life. 2 And it has
also been said that the failure of the testator in one codicil to refer
to a former codicil does not revoke the former codicil.""
OWELTY
The sum assessed against one party to equalize a partition is
called "owelty." ' 4 Atwood v. King, Atwood v. Kleberg has the
interesting circumstance of the testamentary trustees themselves
applying this doctrine of owelty in partitioning the residuary
estate of the testratrix. It had previously been held that the court
in a partition proceeding has a right to assess "owelty" in adjust.
ing equities between tenants in common.36
In the principal case, the testratrix devised the residuary estate
to trustees in trust for ten years and until the final partition and
::0 Ibid.
31 "A mere reference to the date of the original will ... does not effect a revocation
of the antecedent codicils, but is a ratification of the will as modified by the codicils."
68 C. J. 868,1585 (1934).
8" Eubank v. Moore, 15 S. W. (2d) 567 (Tea. Comm. App. 1929).
23 Wamken v. Warnken, 104 S. W. (2d) 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) writ of error dis.
missed by agreement.
34 30 WOas AND PHRAsES 588 (1940).
31163 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
26 Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tea. 57, 161 S. W. (2d) 769 (1942).
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distribution by them of all her estate. Furthermore, the will auth.
orized them to act as though they were the owners of the property,
except where the will expressly provided otherwise.
In making the deeds in partition, the trustees charged the parties
receiving the residuary estate with debts of the estate to the extent
of the full value of the residuary estate. The court held that the
doctrine of owelty is well recognized in Texas and such action
was within the discretion of the trustees.
INTEREST ON PECUNIARY LEGACIES
Williams v. Smith"' clearly states the fundamental purpose in
awarding interest. It is the general rule that pecuniary legacies
bear interest from the time they are due and payable."8 This case
holds that such interest is awarded purely as an incident of, or
accretion to, the legacy itself as compensation for loss the bene-
ficiary suffers by reason of delay, and is not imposed on the
executor or testamentary trustee as a penalty for default or
neglect."'
R.L.S.
,7 ...... TeX ....... ,206 S. W. (2d) 208 (1947).
3s Claftin v. Holmes, 202 Mass. 157, 88 N. E. 664 (1909) ; In re Brandon's Estate, 164
Wia. 387, 160 N. W. 177 (1916) ; 69 C. J. 1260 (1934).
9Sate Bank of Chicago v. Gross, 344 Ill. 512, 176 N. E. 739 (1931); Davidson v.
Rake, 44 N. J. Eq. 506, 16 A. 227 (1888).
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